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The Issue 
The discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Alberta and the subsequent 
U.S. border closure raised concerns about the reliance of Canada’s cattle industry upon 
U.S. packers. It became clear that Canada lacked the slaughter capacity to support the 
number of cattle going to market. This and other factors resulted in steep price declines. 
Since 2003, slaughter capacity has increased by approximately 46 percent.  Given that 
many of the start-ups are small-scale operations that in many cases lack experience and 
financial  backing,  questions  arise  regarding  the  viability  and  sustainability  of  these 
enterprises.  
This study examines existing processing capacity as well as planned expansions and 
discusses  the  implications  for  Canadian  cattle  prices.  Even  though  the  U.S.  border 
reopened  in  July  2005,  concerns  about  slaughter  capacity  remain.  Animals  over  30 
months of age must still be slaughtered in Canada. There are also ongoing concerns about 
Canada’s continued ability to export live cattle to the United States. Future exports are 
threatened by potential trade actions and by unpredictable animal health issues that could 
again close the border. 
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Implications and Conclusions 
There is no guarantee that small, start-up slaughter facilities will achieve success in an 
industry characterized by economies of scale. Such plants should not attempt to operate as 
scaled-down versions of their larger counterparts, but should exploit specialty markets 
where larger firms lack flexibility. If projected slaughter capacity were realized, fed cattle 
prices would recover to near baseline pre-BSE levels, but the price of cull animals would 
remain well below pre-BSE levels. Fed and cull cattle prices could both improve with 
further expansions to slaughter capacity for animals aged over 30 months.  
Background 
The  closure  of  the  U.S.  border  to  exports  of  live  Canadian  cattle  required  that  cattle 
previously exported for slaughter in the United States must compete with cattle that were 
normally slaughtered in Canada for hooks in Canadian plants. The excess supply of cattle 
relative to domestic slaughter capacity caused live cattle prices to decline significantly. 
During the initial weeks following the May 2003 discovery of a Canadian case of BSE, 
the markets for cattle and beef were characterized by the inability to export live animals or 
meat, an unwillingness to market cows or fed cattle because of steep price declines and 
uncertainty over when exports might resume, dramatically reduced slaughter levels, and 
general  uncertainty  about  the  market.  In  September  2003,  U.S.  and  Mexican  markets 
reopened to boneless beef from Canadian animals less than 30 months of age. Backlogs in 
the system began to decrease as slaughter activity increased and cattle were delivered to 
market.  
Prior  to  the  closure  of  the  U.S.  border,  Canada  was  heavily  dependent  upon  the 
United States as a market for its slaughter cattle. Live exports of fed cattle were 594,636 
head out of 3.5 million head total marketings (17 percent) in 2002, while 429,742 cull 
slaughter animals out of 990,860 head total marketings (44 percent) were exported that 
year (Canfax, 2004). Canada is also a major exporter – and importer – of beef products, 
and the United States is the largest market for those products. Total exports of beef into 
the United States from Canada were slightly over 363,453 tonnes in 2002, representing 
approximately 40 percent of total beef production; an additional 9 percent was exported to 
other destinations (AAFC, 2005).
1 Given Canada’s reliance on U.S. slaughter capacity 
and the subsequent loss of this marketing avenue, it is no wonder that new slaughter 
facilities are now being planned.  
The North American beef packing industry has evolved into two types of operations. 
The first involves high throughput plants (over one million head slaughtered each year) 
specializing in slaughtering fed steers and heifers and selling their output as boxed beef. 
With the U.S. border closed, boxed beef from these young animals was the only product 
allowed into the U.S.  market.  The second subset of packers generally operate smaller Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
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plants, slaughter cattle of varying quality (often even multiple species), cater to smaller 
specialized niche markets, and do not produce boxed beef.  
MacArthur, Briere, and Bell (2005) provide a relatively complete description of recent 
planned expansions to Canadian slaughter capacity. Of the eighteen ventures that plan to 
expand or create federally inspected slaughter facilities, ten aim to slaughter 500 or fewer 
animals each day; an additional three expect to slaughter between 500 and 1,000 animals 
each day. The remaining five companies – including Canada’s two largest packers, Cargill 
and Lakeside Packers (Tyson/IBP) – plan capacity to kill more than 1,000 animals each 
day. Eleven of the planned plants intend to kill animals over 30 months of age, either 
exclusively  or  in  combination  with  younger  animals.  The  total  anticipated  investment 
exceeds $625 million, with plans by two ventures to each invest over $100 million. Two 
of  the  more  modest  expenditure  plans  are  by  Canada’s  two  largest  packers,  another 
planned investment has been in the works for years, and another investment involves a 
former president of XL Foods, Canada’s third largest beefpacking firm. However, most of 
the planned investments involve a collection of cattle producers who have little or no prior 
meatpacking experience, and several of the investments involve decommissioned plants. 
Many of the ventures involve new generation cooperatives; some involve niche markets 
such as natural beef. As result, most of these enterprises will face considerable challenges, 
whether or not the U.S. border reopens to exports of older cattle or beef derived from 
them. 
Table 1 shows beef slaughter facilities in Canada with current or near-term planned 
capacities of greater than 1,000 head per day, as well as the category of cattle slaughtered 
at the plants. Cargill Foods in High River and Lakeside Packers in Brooks each have 
planned processing capacities of 5,000 head per day in the near future (MacArthur, Briere, 
and Bell, 2005). Table 2 provides a longer term forecast (2003-2009) of the aggregate 
capacity  for  all  sizes  of  slaughter  facilities  within  Canada.  The  projection  in  table  2 
provides  both  weekly  and  annual  capacities  and  separate  capacities  for  fed  (under  30 
months) and cull slaughter (over 30 months) cattle.
2 
The breakdown of slaughter by category of cattle has important implications for the 
cattle  and  beef  industries  in  Canada.  During  the  border  closure  period,  plants  that 
slaughtered cattle under 30 months of age for export could not slaughter cattle over 30 
months, and plants slaughtering older cattle were obliged to sell all of their production in 
the domestic market. It is expected that with planned expansion, in a few years Canada’s 
slaughter capacity for cattle under 30 months will be able to accommodate all marketings 
at pre-BSE levels. This is not the case for older cattle, for which it is expected that kill 
levels will not soon approach those required to accommodate normal marketings. Existing 
under-30-month facilities may be reluctant to add capacity for animals over 30 months 
into  their  existing  operations,  partly  due  to  switching  costs  associated  with 
accommodating the larger animal frame size typically associated with culls. Furthermore, 
new ventures dedicated to slaughter of animals over 30 months are potentially risky due to Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
 
 
      88 
the historical seasonality of availability of cull cattle: cows are usually culled from the 
herd in the spring and fall; as a result there is a lack of a consistent supply of cattle aged 
over 30 months in Canada (Grier, 2005).  
Challenges for New Entrants 
A major challenge faced by small plants slaughtering younger or older cattle is the scale 
economies  that  characterize  beef  slaughter.  A  number  of  studies  (including  and 
summarized in MacDonald et al., 2000) have found that there are non-trivial economies of 
scale in beef packing, even with live animal input outlays approaching 85 percent of total 
costs. 
Table 1  Largest Canadian Beefpacking Plants, Current & Planned Capacities 
Daily kill 
Company  Plant location  Category 
Current  Planned 
Cargill Foods  High River, AB  fed cattle  4,100  5,000 
Lakeside Packers  Brooks, AB  fed cattle  4,000  5,000 
Better Beef Ltd.  Guelph, ON  fed cattle  1,900  1,900 
XL Beef  Calgary, AB  mixture  1,000  1,000 
XL Beef  Moose Jaw, SK  fed cattle   900  1,200 
Colbex/Levinoff  St. Cyrille, QC  cull cows   720  1,040 
Note: In some cases numbers have been converted from weekly to daily.  
A five-day kill week was assumed. 
Sources: Canfax, Cattlemen, and MacArthur, Briere, and Bell. 
Table 2  Canadian Weekly Cattle Slaughter, Federal & Provincial Inspection 
Class  2003  2004  2005  2006     2009 
Federally inspected            
fed cattle  61,220  71,270  76,910  81,410     88,397 
non-fed  11,920  10,020  15,720  15,470     16,798 
annual total  3,657,000  4,064,500  4,631,500  4,844,000     5,259,741 
Provincially inspected          
fed cattle  2,763  3,500  3,500  3,500     3,500 
non-fed  943  1,500  1,500  1,500     1,500 
annual total  185,300  250,000  250,000  250,000     250,000 
Total slaughter            
weekly total  76,846  86,290  97,630  101,880     110,195 
annual total  3,842,300  4,314,500  4,881,500  5,094,000     5,509,741 
Note: Slaughter numbers are end-of-year. 
Source: Personal correspondence with AAFC and CANFAX. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
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Estimates of minimum efficient scale (MES) are difficult to obtain, but Ward (1988) 
estimated this minimum to be just over a million animals annually (4,048 each day) and it 
is probable that MES has increased in the time since that research was conducted. Only 
Cargill  and  Lakeside  Packers  are  operating  beyond  this  scale  of  operation,  and  the 
majority of the planned expansions will have only a fraction of this capacity. If significant 
economies of scale exist within an industry, conditions are created whereby large packers 
may be able to raise bids for cattle and operate profitably while small packers could not 
afford to pay the same cattle prices. Estimates cited in MacDonald et al. suggest that 
plants  killing  1.35  million  head  per  year  (4,500  each  day)  have  a  cost  advantage 
(including the cost of acquiring cattle) of between 4.6 and 7 percent under the costs of a 
plant killing 175 thousand head per year (583 each day).  
A  second  advantage  of  larger  packers  relative  to  smaller  scale  operations  is  their 
advantage in offering an  assured supply of a homogeneous product in large volumes. 
Bigger plants can produce greater quantities of multiple products for buyers. There are 
transaction costs associated with boxed beef, offal, and hide purchases for downstream 
buyers, and these costs are reduced by increasing the scale of the purchase. Larger plants 
can have economies of scope in producing several products jointly at a lower cost than the 
products can be produced individually. Lakeside Packers, pre-BSE,  would run a short 
shift of cull cows through one of their processing lines near the end of the production day. 
They could do so on a large enough scale to economically justify the switching costs to 
prepare the line for a run of culls. A smaller scale plant might not be able to do so – its 
scale of production would be unlikely to create enough revenue to justify the costs of 
preparing a line for a run of different sizes of animals. So these economies are typically 
not  available  to  smaller  plants,  although  such  plants  may  offer  a  broader  variety  of 
products.   
Given these considerable advantages for incumbent firms that can process cattle on a 
larger scale, questions arise about the conditions under which processing on a reduced 
scale would be successful. The survival rates for small plants are quite poor in general. 
MacDonald and Ollinger note that successful small plants do not try to operate as scaled-
down versions of their larger counterparts. Rather, they resourcefully engage in activities 
that larger plants lack the flexibility to accommodate. 
Small plants, for instance, often cover a much wider array of products and processes 
than  do  large  plants.  They  also  are  more  likely  to  operate  as  multi-species  plants,  a 
practice no longer carried out by large plants because of the loss of efficiency associated 
with doing so. Plants with lower capacities are also more likely to specialize in slaughter 
of cattle with nonstandard shapes and sizes, or to rely upon sales of high-quality beef to 
local  or  regional  restaurant  markets.  Smaller  plants  can  also  overcome  the  challenges 
associated with limited processing capacity by targeting niche markets on a greater scale 
than their larger competitors are able to do.  Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
 
 
      90 
Conversely, the goals of high throughput and increased efficiency drive larger plants. 
These plants are, first and foremost, producers of generic boxed beef, an intermediate 
product. The value added to their product further downstream (i.e., by further processing 
into retail cuts) often accrues to others in the supply chains that specialize in marketing 
retail products. A smaller plant, while killing many fewer cattle, might be able to more 
effectively target segments of the market seeking (and willing to pay for) particular retail 
product attributes such as tenderness, flavour, organic characteristics, and others. 
Price Impacts of Capacity Expansion 
The impacts on fed and cull cattle prices
3 resulting from a closed border for exports of 
live  animals  and  of  beef  from  animals  over  30  months  are  obtained  from  Rude  and 
Carlberg (2005). A small dynamic annual synthetic model of Canadian cattle and beef 
markets was built, where cattle prices are determined domestically, high- and low-quality 
beef
4 is consumed domestically and exported into the U.S. market, and Canadian high-
quality  beef  prices  are  linked  to  U.S.  prices.  A  Canadian  market-clearing  condition 
determined the price of low-quality beef. The model was simulated over a sufficiently 
long period
5 for markets to adjust given the projected expansion in slaughter capacity. In 
the baseline scenario, fed and cull cattle prices are linked to U.S. prices. After BSE is 
introduced
6  into  the  model,  these  prices  are  determined  by  Canadian  market-clearing 
conditions for each animal. 
Two alternative scenarios are considered: a closed border where processing capacity 
is assumed to expand at the rate described in table 2; and a scenario where slaughter 
capacity for cows and bulls is reduced by 20 percent below the projected growth rates.
7 
The fed and cull cattle price paths for these scenarios are shown in figures 1 and 2. Each 
graph shows the path of prices in the no-BSE baseline and the temporal adjustment of 
prices in response to a closed border with projected processing capacity (solid black line) 
and with a reduction in projected cull slaughter capacity (dashed line).  
The immediate impact of a closed border is that fed cattle prices decline by $31/cwt 
from the baseline, and cull cattle prices decline by $27/cwt. This result is consistent with 
actual price declines in 2003. For the projected slaughter capacity scenario, the gap in fed 
cattle prices between the baseline and the closed border case gradually closes over the 
seven-year adjustment, with price recovering to baseline levels at the end of the period. It 
is also important to determine implications for these prices should new slaughter capacity 
not materialize. A wide variety of factors may prevent firms from operating at capacity 
limits,  including  the  need  to  perform  regular  maintenance  and  labour  shortages.  This 
scenario was run with slaughter capacity for cows and bulls reduced by 20 percent below 
the projected growth rates.
8 The reduced-capacity scenario reduces fed cattle prices by an 
additional 8 percent below baseline prices relative to the projected-capacity scenario. The 
gap in these prices is more noticeable later in the simulation period. This is because lower 
cow  prices  initially  increase  inventories  of  cows  and  bulls;  the  increased  breeding Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
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inventory then has a lagged effect, where two years later there are increased marketings of 
fed steers and heifers and this in turn puts downward pressure on fed cattle prices.  
Figure 2 illustrates the impact on cull cattle prices. The gap in prices, between the no-
BSE baseline and the closed border projected-capacity case, is not eliminated throughout 
the simulation. The gap is somewhat reduced by the end of the simulation. This result is 
not surprising, as just prior to the closing of the border the ratio of live animals exported 
to the total number marketed was much higher for cull animals (45 percent) than for fed 
cattle (17 percent). The most noticeable effect is the decline in cow prices to $10/cwt in 
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Figure 2  Impact of a closed border on cull cattle prices. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
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prices  are  on  average  an  additional  11  percent  below  baseline  prices  relative  to  the 
scenario with a closed border and projected slaughter capacity.  
Recently the United States allowed imports of live Canadian cattle under the age of 30 
months. This creates another avenue for primary producers to market their livestock, but it 
also reduces incentive to expand domestic slaughter capacity. It is still not possible to 
export animals over 30 months of age, and these animals must be slaughtered and their 
meat  consumed domestically.  This has implications for the overall potential Canadian 
herd size and for how much fed beef can be produced. Slaughter capacity for cull cattle 
not only supports the price of these animals but also affects the rest of the industry. 
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Endnotes 
1  These  trade  data  were  obtained  from  Statistics  Canada  HS  2013010  -  1602909900. 
These trade numbers may differ from frequently cited export volumes (CANFAX and 
Livestock Market Review) because they were obtained from Statistics Canada, while the 
alternative numbers are reported from USDA import numbers for Canada. 
2  The  expansion  projections  for  2003  to  2006  were  obtained  through  personal 
correspondence with officials from Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. It was necessary 
to extend the projection to 2009 for this article, so an additional growth rate of 8 percent 
was applied to the federally inspected slaughter projection to provide the forecast in the 
final column of table 2. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  J. Rude and J. Carlberg 
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3 Alberta steer prices are used to reflect the price of fed cattle throughout this study, and 
weighted-average (D1-D2) cow prices are used to reflect the price of cull animals. 
4  Low-quality  meat  consists  of  the  chuck,  brisket  and  shank,  and  flank  of  fed  plus 
trimmings from other parts of the carcass. High-quality beef consists of the hip, sirloin, 
loin and rib. For steers and heifers, low-quality meat consists of 43 percent of the carcass 
after these cuts and trimmings. High-quality meat is 57 percent of the carcass of a steer or 
heifer. The dressed carcass of cull cows and bulls is assumed to consist of 89 percent low-
quality  beef.  The  wholesale  price  of  low-quality  beef  is  derived  from  an  industrial 
produce price index for hamburger. Low-quality beef from older animals is not exported 
5 The model is simulated over the seven-year period prior to the first case of BSE. This 
baseline was chosen because it is sufficiently long to allow the model to fully adjust after 
the initial shock of closing the border to live cattle trade. 
6 A closed border as a result of BSE is introduced in the first year of the seven-year period 
in the alternative scenarios. 
7  Sensitivity  analysis  is  not  run  for  steer  and  heifer  slaughter  capacity,  given  that  a 
significant amount of this investment is being made by large existing processors Cargill, 
Tyson Foods, and XL Foods; therefore, the projections for this capacity expansion are 
more certain. 
8 This reduction in processing capacity is imposed from the second to the final year of the 
simulation. 